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Abstract
Background: Recent increases in the bulk-billing rate have been taken as an indication that the
Federal government's Strengthening Medicare initiative, and particularly the bulk-billing incentives,
are 'working'. Given the enduring geographic differences in the supply of general practitioners
(GPs) it is timely to reconsider the impact that this increase in the provision of 'free care' will have
on access to Medicare-funded GP services in rural and urban areas of Australia. Utilisation has been
modelled as two different stochastic processes: the decision to consult and the frequency of
consultation.
Results: In the decision to consult model the supply of FFS GPs is a more important predictor of
utilisation than the bulk-billing rate. Paradoxically the modelling predicts that ceteris paribus
increases in either GP supply or the bulk-billing rate appear to have perverse effects in some areas
by decreasing utilisation. In the frequency of consultation model, GP density is not a predictor and
increasing the bulk-billing rate will unambiguously increase the frequency of consultation across all
areas. In both models, the positive impacts associated with changes in supply and cost are
constrained outside the inner metropolitan area by reduced geographic accessibility to Medicare-
funded GP services. The modelling also shows that people are more likely to consult a GP in areas
of high socioeconomic disadvantage, although socioeconomic status is not a predictor of frequency
of consultation.
Conclusion: Bulk-billing rates and the supply of FFS GPs are important features of the Australian
health care system that are, potentially, amenable to policy manipulation. The implications of this
research are that government policies designed to achieve similarity in these characteristics across
geographic areas will not result in equity of access because they fail to address problems caused by
geographic inaccessibility in rural and remote areas. Attempting to increase bulk-billing rates in
some of these areas may, in fact, reduce access to FFS GP services.
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Background
In April 2003 the Federal government announced a policy
initiative called A Fairer Medicare. This initiative was heav-
ily criticised and enabling legislation failed to pass the
Senate. A revised version of the policy, called Medicare
Plus, was announced in November 2003. Further revisions
ensued before Medicare Plus was passed by the Federal par-
liament in March 2004 and its name was subsequently
changed to Strengthening Medicare [1]. Strengthening Medi-
care aimed to improve access (including affordability) to
out-of-hospital medical services and contained twenty-
seven separate measures including incentive payments for
general practitioners (GPs) to encourage bulk-billing of
concession card holders and children under sixteen years
(particularly in regional, rural and remote areas) and a
series of measures to attract GPs to work in areas of under-
supply such as outer metropolitan, regional and remote
areas [1,2].
Although Strengthening Medicare and its precursors were
not specifically aimed at increasing the bulk-billing rate,
there was considerable debate about the impact that the
initiatives would have on the bulk-billing rate and access
to GP services (see for example, the first and second
reports of the Senate Select Committee on Medicare)
[3,4]. Also, one of the effectiveness indicators developed
by the Department of Health and Ageing to measure
progress towards Departmental outcomes in relation to
access to Medicare is 'the percentage of Medicare services
that are direct billed with no gap charged' [2]. Recent
increases in the overall bulk-billing rate for GP services
have been seen as an indication that the Strengthening
Medicare package, and bulk-billing incentives in particu-
lar, are 'working' [1,5]. Given the recent increases in the
level of bulk-billing (i.e. 'free care') provided by fee-for-
service (FFS) GPs and enduring geographic differences in
the supply of GPs, it is pertinent to question what impact
increases in the bulk-billing rate will have on access to
Medicare-funded GP services in different parts of
Australia.
The most widely accepted study examining the relation-
ship between price and utilisation of doctors' services is
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) in the
United States. HIE results show that utilisation of outpa-
tient services decreases when patients are required to pay
a co-payment and that there are no differences in the
nature of the response across geographic areas [6]. Rich-
ardson applied the HIE results to Australian Medicare data
and concludes that 78% of the change in GP service utili-
sation in the 1976–1986 period and 94% of the change in
the 1984/85–1989/90 period were not related to
decreases in consumer co-payments – other factors were at
work [7].
A review of Australian cross sectional studies examining
factors associated with GP consultation rates indicates
that higher frequencies are associated with lower cost, [8-
10] patients having a health care card, [11] patients being
in poorer health, [9,11] and with areas of higher propor-
tions older age residents [10]. Lower frequencies are to be
found in areas with higher levels of education [8] and
among female patients with higher levels of education, [9]
in less geographically accessible (eg rural) areas [10,11]
and among female patients with an internal Health Locus
of Control [9]. One study with highly aggregated levels of
data showed an increase in the frequency of consultation
in low socioeconomic status areas [12]. Another indicated
that the relationship was not so straightforward. Low soci-
oeconomic status was associated with an increase in the
consultation rate in highly accessible areas and low con-
sultation rates in inaccessible areas, [13] suggesting sup-
ply side factors are also important.
Cross sectional results for the impact of GP supply gener-
ally indicate an increase in supply being associated with
an increase in frequency of consultation [10,14,15]. One
Australian study by Doessel [16] indicated there was no
association between GP supply and population based fre-
quency of utilisation rates. However, Richardson and Pea-
cock have indicated that these results should be
interpreted carefully [15].
Observed associations between increases in doctor supply
and increases in frequency of utilisation have given rise to
the notion of supplier induced demand (SID). SID sug-
gests that doctors are imperfect agents and can induce
demand for health care, which directly conflicts with the
full information and consumer sovereignty assumptions
of the orthodox model of demand and supply [17]. Vol-
umes of empirical evidence addressing the possibility of
SID have been presented from a range of different health
systems, and have been reviewed elsewhere [18-20]. Many
of the studies reviewed have used cross-sectional data sets
to examine the effect of doctor supply on the frequency of
utilization of health care services [14,21-24].
However, studies examining only the frequency of utilisa-
tion do not take into account the nature of the decision
making process in the demand for non-emergency care
which is thought to reflect sequential decisions involving
both the individual and the GP [25]. Initially an individ-
ual decides whether to seek out health care or advice. This
decision to consult is derived from the demand for health
[26] and reflects an individual's beliefs about the severity
of their condition, the availability of health care and their
expectation of any potential benefits. Once the contact
decision has been made and acted upon, the individual
and the doctor decide on the type and amount of health
services to be provided and the frequency of futureAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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consultations. Although the decision about the type,
amount and frequency of future consultations is made
primarily by the GP [6,27,28] the patient also has a role in
this decision. The extent to which the patient participates
in the decision depends on the nature of the doctor-
patient agency relationship [29].
A small number of studies have attempted to examine the
effect of the supply of doctors upon the patient-initiated
and doctor-initiated components of utilisation. The
results of these studies are inconclusive. Rossiter and
Wilensky found that increases in doctor supply had no
effect on patient-initiated visits but did have a small effect
on doctor-initiated visits and took this to be evidence of
SID [30,31]. On the other hand, Escarce found that
increased availability increased initial contacts but had lit-
tle effect on the intensity of subsequent visits, the doctor-
initiated component [32]. There is only one Australian
study examining the patient-initiated component of the
utilisation process. This study found a higher proportion
of the resident population consulting a GP in areas with a
greater supply of GPs, areas which have higher propor-
tions of younger and older age residents, and areas of
lower cost (higher bulk-billing rates). Lower proportions
were associated with rural areas [10].
One of the shortcomings of much of the Australian work
on the relationship between cost, supply and utilisation of
GP services is the inability of the studies to account for
border-crossing by patients. There is ample evidence that
patients do not necessarily visit the nearest GP when they
decide to see a doctor [33,34]. The studies also indicate
significant interactions between the variables associated
with utilisation of GP services yet these interactions do
not appear to have been systematically explored. And the
studies are not always inclusive: some target specific
demographic groups, others omit certain age groups or
geographic areas from their analyses. Finally, despite their
widespread acceptance, [35] the generalisability of the
HIE results has been questioned [36,37] and their rele-
vance to the Australian situation is not clear.
This research uses publicly accessible data to investigate
the likely impact of an increase in the bulk-billing rates
and GP supply on access to Medicare-funded GP services
in rural and urban areas. The methodology is based on an
analysis of aggregated data from various sources and has
been developed to be inclusive of all geographic areas and
age groups, to take into account border crossing by
patients, to systematically explore the interactions among
the variables and to accommodate the two-part decision-
making process thought to underlie the utilisation of GP
services.
Methods
Unit of analysis
Divisions of General Practice consist of 'geographically co-
located group(s) of general practitioners who have
formed an organization to work together ... to improve
health outcomes at the local level' and provide GPs with a
'corporate identity' as well as a 'method of influencing the
organization of health care delivery' [38]. Divisions can,
therefore, be regarded as geographically defined service
delivery systems and are appropriate aggregation units for
modelling the relationship between price, supply and uti-
lisation of health care services. One hundred and twenty-
one Divisions are included in the analysis.
Data
Two utilisation models have been developed. The first
reflects the decision to consult an FFS GP and the second
reflects the frequency of consultation once the decision to
consult has been made. These contact and frequency deci-
sions are modelled as two different stochastic processes
[28]. Failure to do this can lead to inconsistent parameter
estimates and misinterpretation of results [25].
Decision to Consult Model
A patient to population ratio (decision to consult index)
was considered an appropriate outcome variable for the
contact model and, to overcome the problems of border
crossing, the index has been defined as the number of
Whole Patient Equivalents (WPEs) per head of resident
population. (See the notes to Table 1 for the definition of
WPE.)
Frequency of Consultation Model
Group A1 (General Practitioner) and Group A2 (Other
un-referred) professional attendances are the basic build-
ing blocks of the Medicare system. In the 1998–99 finan-
cial year these services accounted for 95% of Medicare all
services and 92% of the Medicare dollar benefits paid
(excluding oral maxillofacial services) [39]. Frequency of
consultation has been defined as the number of Group A1
and Group A2 services per Standardized Whole Patient
Equivalent (SWPE). (See the notes to Table 1 for the defi-
nition of SWPE.)
Based on the review of the literature, the aim of the
research and an exploration of the available data, the pre-
dictor variables initially entered into both models were: a
Divisional measure of geographic accessibility, the bulk-
billing rate, GP density, level of socioeconomic disadvan-
tage of the resident population, and the proportion of the
resident population born in a non-English speaking back-
ground (NESB) country. The proportion of the resident
population that is female, and the average age of the resi-
dent population were also entered into the decision to
consult model but not in the frequency of consultationAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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model as age and gender are controlled for in the outcome
variable. Sociodemographic information is based on the
1996 census and all other data relates to the 1998–99
financial year. The relevant data sources for the variables
are shown in Table 1.
Assuming that Australian Bureau of Statistics postal areas
are an adequate approximation of postcode areas, a pop-
ulation weighted geographic accessibility value was calcu-
lated for each Division by multiplying the Accessibility/
Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA) [40] for each postal
area by the proportion of the Divisional population living
in the matching postcode and then summing the results
across all Divisional postcodes. Values range from zero to
twelve and low values indicate greater geographic accessi-
bility. The Divisional index of disadvantage has been
derived from the 1996 Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas
(SEIFA) Index of Disadvantage [41] statistics for each
Division. Values of this index range from one to eleven
and the original variable has been recoded so that higher
values indicate higher levels of socioeconomic disadvan-
tage. GP density is the number of vocationally registered
plus other GPs per 1,000 head of resident population.
Summary statistics for the variables used in the modelling
are shown in Table 2.
Analysis
Stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses
have been undertaken for both models. A forward selec-
tion algorithm with an exclusion threshold of p > 0.2 has
been used to enter each of the predictor variables. The
main predictor variables which were not excluded using
Table 1: Variables and sources of data for the regression models
Variables Data Sources
Dependent: decision to consult index
Whole Patient Equivalents (WPEs) per head of population* WPEs: Table S2 in the Statistical Appendix to the report The General 
Practice Workforce in Australia†
Population: HealthWIZ v6.2‡ based on 1996 census
Dependent: frequency of consultation
Group A1 and A2 consults per Standardized Whole Patient Equivalent 
(SWPE)¶
Group A1 and A2 Consultations: available at http://www.hic.gov.au/
providers/online_initiatives/hic_online.htm accessed Sept 7 2003
SPWEs: Table S2 in the Statistical Appendix to the report The General 
Practice Workforce in Australia†
Predictor variables
Geographic accessibility: Population weighted ARIA values for each 
Division
% Population in postcodes for each Division: available at http://
www.health.gov.au/hsdd/gp/divspc.htm accessed Jul 11 2003
Population in each postcode: HealthWIZ v6.2‡ based on 1996 census
ARIA values for postal areas originally accessed at http://
www.health.gov.au/ari/aria/htm accessed 26 Feb 2002. This url is no 
longer available but information about the data can be found at http://
www.gisca.adelaide.edu.au/products_services/ariav2.html.
Bulk billing rate for general practice consultations HealthWIZ v6.2‡
Dr Density: number of GPs and Other primary medical care doctors per 
1,000 head of population
Vocationally Registered GPs and Other primary care practitioners: 
Table S2 in the Statistical Appendix to the report The General Practice 
Workforce in Australia†, derived from the 1998 Medical labour force 
survey undertaken by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW), Canberra
Population: HealthWIZ v6.2‡ based on 1996 census
Index of Disadvantage Population at each level of disadvantage within a Division: HealthWIZ 
v6.2‡
% population born in NESB country; % female, av age HealthWIZ v6.2‡ based on 1996 census
Notes: * WPEs are derived by the GP Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing as an indicator of patient load for each 
practice. If a patient consulted at only one general practice during a financial year, the patient is counted as one WPE for the practice. If a patients 
visits more than one general practice, the patient is counted as a fraction of a WPE based on the schedule fee value for each general practice 
consulted.
† Australian Medical Workforce Advisory Committee: The General Practice Workforce in Australia. AMWAC Report 2000.2.
‡ Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, National Social Health Statistical Database, developed by Prometheus Information Pty Ltd, 
commonly known as HealthWIZ. See Other Products at http://prometheus.com.au/html_control/index_frame.htm
¶ SWPEs are standardised WPEs. 'The standardisation process is based on National Medical and Department of Veterans' Affairs claims figures for 
each of 16 age/gender categories. The standardisation is achieved by allocating each patient to one of sixteen categories and multiplying the WPE 
value for each patient by the appropriate weight.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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this threshold formed the 'stem' and their two-way and
three-way interactions were entered sequentially using the
same algorithm and exclusion criteria.
Results
Decision to consult model
The main predictor variables for the decision to consult
model are GP density, bulk-billing rate, socioeconomic
disadvantage of the resident population and geographic
accessibility (ARIA). Age, gender and NESB status of the
resident population are not predictors in this model. The
signs of the predictor variables indicate that:
• Higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage in the res-
ident population are associated with higher levels of the
decision to consult index.
• Lower ARIA scores (higher geographic accessibility) are
associated with higher levels in the decision to consult
index.
• Although the signs for GP density and bulk-billing rates
are positive, the three-way interaction term in the model
indicates that the relationships between the decision to
consult an FFS GP and the supply of GPs and bulk-billing
rate are not straightforward. (Table 3)
Rewriting the regression equation in the following way
clarifies the relationship between the decision to consult
and the bulk-billing rate.
Decision to consult = 0.497 + 0.234*GP density +
0.018*Index of disadvantage + Bulk-billing rate*(0.127 -
0.037*ARIA*GP density) - 0.010*ARIA
This equation shows that the positive effect associated
with any given bulk-billing rate will be greatest in the
most highly accessible Divisions (i.e. where ARIA = 0),
and the 'turning point' occurs where the bracketed term
equals zero (i.e. when. ARIA*GP density = 3.4 and
0.037*ARIA*GP density = 0.127). In the data set used for
this analysis, there are twenty-one Divisions where
ARIA*GP density is greater than 3.4. The modelling pre-
dicts that increasing the bulk-billing rate ceteris paribus in
these twenty-one Divisions will lead to a decrease in the
number of people consulting an FFS GP within the
Division. As can be seen in Table 4, not all these Divisions
are characterised by low bulk-billing rates and/or low
decision to consult indices.
The standardized beta coefficients in Table 3 indicate that
GP density is the most important predictor in the decision
to consult model. The regression equation can also be
Table 2: Summary of the dependent and predictor variables
Highly Accessible* 
n = 64
Accessible* 
n = 37
Moderately Accessible* 
n = 7
Remote* 
n = 6
Very Remote* 
n = 5
Dependent Variables
WPEs/head of popn Mean 0.95 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.54
SD 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.12
Consults/SWPE Mean 6.52 4.98 4.8 5.08 4.61
SD 0.91 0.53 0.42 0.44 0.62
Predictor Variables
ARIA value Mean 0.22 2.39 4.77 6.87 10.12
SD 0.28 0.80 0.65 0.56 0.82
Bulk-billing rate Mean 82.8% 55.7% 52.1% 65.5% 71.4%
SD 11.2% 13.4% 15.2% 7.0% 20.6%
GP density Mean 1.21 0.97 0.87 0.77 0.82
SD 0.33 0.16 0.27 0.17 0.16
Index of disadvantage Mean 6.80 5.00 4.50 3.61 3.93
SD 2.31 1.38 0.84 0.22 0.52
% born NESB country Mean 16.0% 3.9% 4.9% 4.8% 3.9%
SD 10.4% 1.6% 2.6% 1.5% 1.9%
% female Mean 50.4% 50.3% 49.5% 48.5% 47.6%
SD 1.3% 1.0% 1.8% 2.7% 3.1%
Average age (yrs) Mean 35.22 35.62 33.86 34.09 32.08
SD 2.45 1.76 2.20 2.32 2.15
Data Sources: See Table 1
Notes: * Categories based on the following ARIA values: highly accessible = 0 – 1.84, accessible = >1.84 – 3.51, moderately accessible = >3.51 – 
5.80, remote = >5,80 – 9.08, very remote = <9.02 – 12. Source: Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, Accessibility/Remoteness Index 
of Australia (ARIA), available at http://www.health.gov.au/ari/aria.htm Accessed 8th January 2000.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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rewritten to emphasise the relationship between utilisa-
tion and GP density.
Decision to consult = 0.497 + 0.018*Index of disadvan-
tage + 0.127*Bulk-billing rate + GP density*(0.234 -
0.037*ARIA*Bulk-billing rate) - 0.010*ARIA
The positive effect associated with GP density will be
greatest in highly accessible Divisions (ARIA = 0) and the
'turning point' will occur when ARIA*Bulk-billing rate
equals 6.3. In the current data set this occurs in the three
very remote Divisions: 233, 610 and 802. The modelling
predicts that increasing GP density ceteris paribus in these
Table 3: Regression model for decision to consult
Model Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients t-value Significance
B Std Error Beta
Constant 0.497 0.039 12.897 0.000
GP density 0.234 0.020 0.559 11.717 0.000
Index of disadvantage 0.018 0.003 0.299 6.458 0.000
Bulk-billing rate 0.127 0.032 0.177 3.977 0.000
ARIA -0.010 0.006 -0.205 -1.812 0.073
ARIA * GP density * Bulk-billing rate -0.037 0.008 -0.444 -4.308 0.000
Notes: ARIA = population weighted Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia
Higher index of disadvantage = higher level of socioeconomic disadvantage
Dependent variable = number of Whole Patient Equivalents (WPEs) per head of population (see Table 1)
Table 4: Divisions in which an increase in the bulk-billing rate will decrease the number of people consulting an FFS GP
Geographic Accessibility Bulk-billing rate Index of disadvantage† GP density‡ WPEs per head of population¶
Accessible*
1. 230 59% 6.8 0.96 0.82
2. 412 73% 4.7 1.19 0.93
3. 413 81% 4.5 1.06 0.85
4. 507 69% 8.0 1.37 0.90
5. 609 47% 5.3 0.89 0.80
Moderately Accessible*
6. 231 56% 7.2 0.90 0.78
7. 411 51% 5.6 0.96 0.79
8. 509 21% 7.7 1.26 0.84
9. 511 69% 7.1 0.84 0.86
10. 801 62% 5.8 1.07 0.67
Remote*
11. 241 76% 9.1 0.69 0.76
12. 416 64% 7.3 0.54 0.65
13. 417 64% 7.9 0.73 0.71
14. 512 72% 7.8 0.90 0.74
15. 611 59% 5.3 1.01 0.71
16. 612 58% 7.0 0.78 0.63
Very Remote*
17. 233 93% 8.9 0.71 0.70
18. 415 57% 6.8 0.65 0.50
19. 610 93% 8.0 1.06 0.38
20. 614 49% 4.8 0.79 0.61
21. 802 65% 6.8 0.89 0.51
Notes: * Categories based on the following ARIA values: highly accessible = 0 – 1.84, accessible = >1.84 – 3.51, moderately accessible = >3.51 – 
5.80, remote = >5,80 – 9.08, very remote = <9.02 – 12. Source: Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, Accessibility/Remoteness Index 
of Australia (ARIA), available at http://www.health.gov.au/ari/aria.htm Accessed 8th January 2002.
† Higher values indicate higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage
‡ Vocationally registered and other GPs per 1,000 head of population
¶ WPE = whole patient equivalent (see Table 1)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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Divisions would lead to a decrease in the number of peo-
ple consulting an FFS GP – an apparently perverse result.
Frequency of consultation model
GP density and socioeconomic disadvantage of the resi-
dent population do not enter as predictor variables in the
frequency of consultation model. As shown in Table 5, the
main predictors are the bulk-billing rate squared and the
proportion of the resident population born in a non-Eng-
lish speaking background (NESB) country. There are two
interaction terms: bulk-billing rate squared*ARIA; and
bulk-billing rate squared*Proportion of the resident pop-
ulation born in an NESB country.
To emphasise the relationship between the bulk-billing
rate and frequency of consultation the regression equa-
tion can be written as:
Frequency of consultation = 4.296 + Bulk-billing rate
sq*(2.767 + 8.108*Propn population born NESB country
- 0.192*ARIA) - 4.154*Propn  population born NESB
country
The positive impact associated with the bulk-billing rate
will be highest in the most geographically accessible Divi-
sions (i.e. where ARIA = 0) which have a high proportion
of the resident population born in an NESB country.
Assuming the proportion of the population born in an
NESB country is zero, then the 'turning point' in the rela-
tionship between bulk-billing and frequency of consulta-
tion will occur when 0.192*ARIA equals 2.767 (i.e. ARIA
= 14.4). Since the maximum ARIA value is twelve the
'turning point' will not be reached and the modelling pre-
dicts that a ceteris paribus increase in the bulk-billing rate
will unambiguously increase the frequency of consulta-
tion across all Divisions.
Performance of the models
In both models the residuals are normally distributed and
both have good explanatory power. The linear R2 value for
the decision to consult is 0.845 and for the frequency of
consultation it is 0.902. (Figure 1)
Discussion
Using publicly accessible data, aggregated to the level of
the Division of General Practice, this research explores the
associations between the bulk-billing rate, the supply of
FFS GPs and utilisation of Medicare-funded GP services in
rural and urban areas of Australia. Although the use of
aggregated data has been described as a useful 'first-cut
method' for getting insights into the 'interplay of macr-
oeconomic variables for the analysis of economic policy',
[42] such data has been criticised because it conceals indi-
vidual differences in economic behaviour [43]. Because
the primary aim of this research is to look at the likely
impact of the Federal government's Strengthening Medicare
policy on access to Medicare-funded GP services it is con-
sidered an appropriate methodology although there are
some caveats that need to be noted.
No inferences can be drawn about the modelled relation-
ships at the intra-Divisional level (i.e. at the individual or
postcode level). It also needs to be borne in mind that the
data used in the modelling related to a period some six
years prior to the introduction of Strengthening Medicare.
Policy changes in the intervening six years may have
changed the nature of the modelled relationships. And a
major assumption underlying the analysis is that the allo-
cation of a single patient to different geographic areas is
the result of border crossing by the patient. To the extent
that the geographic allocation also results from border
crossing by GPs (i.e. patients seen by a GP in one Division
are linked to provider numbers in a different area) then
the extent of border crossing by patients will be over-
stated. It is not clear from the data to what extent the
results are confounded by GPs' border crossing.
Table 5: Regression model for the frequency of consultation
Model Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients t-value Significance
B Std Error Beta
Constant 4.296 0.120 35.777 0.000
Bulk-billing rate squared 2.767 0.204 0.619 13.539 0.000
Bulk-billing rate squared * ARIA -0.192 0.025 -0.248 -7.621 0.000
Propn popn born NESB country -4.154 1.841 -0.369 -2.256 0.026
Propn popn born NESB country * Bulk-billing rate squared 8.108 2.091 0.675 3.878 0.000
Notes: ARIA = population weighted Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia
NESB = Non-English Speaking Background
Dependent variable = number of consults per Standardised Whole Patient Equivalent (SWPE – see Table 1)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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Bearing these caveats in mind, the results indicate that the
relationship between bulk-billing and utilisation is com-
plex. This complexity arises, in part, because utilisation is
a dynamic process involving both the decision to consult
a doctor and the frequency of consultation once contact
has been established. Each stage in this process involves a
unique set of interacting predictor variables. In addition,
each Division represents a unique combination of the pre-
dictor variables which means that the impact of changes
in bulk-billing will differ from Division to Division.
Despite this complexity it is possible to draw a number of
inferences from the modelling that have important policy
implications.
The level of socioeconomic disadvantage in the resident
population has no impact on frequency of consultation
but higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage in the
resident population are associated with higher decision to
consult ratios. These results suggest that, at the Divisional
level, the delivery of FFS GP services in the 1998–99
period was responsive to the needs of socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups.
In many, but not all, Divisions an increase in the bulk-
billing rate will unambiguously increase utilisation of
Medicare-funded GP consults within a given period: it will
increase both the number of people consulting an FFS GP
and the number of visits per patient. However, in a
number of Divisions, an increase in the bulk-billing rate
will simultaneously increase the number of times existing
patients consult and decrease the number of people con-
sulting in a given period. The most straightforward inter-
pretation of this phenomenon is that new patients are
'crowded out' by existing patients' increased use of
services.
Increasing the supply of FFS GPs in a Division will, in all
but three very remote Divisions, increase the number of
people consulting an FFS GP in a given period without
impacting on the number of times patients consult. This
would mean an increase the total number of FFS GP con-
sults in a Division in a given period and, assuming a stable
population, an increase in the number of consults per
head of resident population. The positive relationship
between supply and the number of people contacting a
GP is consistent with both the SID hypothesis and ortho-
dox economic theory, but the modelling also implies that
SID is not occurring at the point in the decision-making
process where it might be most expected to occur – in the
frequency of consultation. These results are consistent
with Escarce's findings in relation to surgeons [32]. The
reasons for the apparently perverse results in the three very
remote Divisions cannot be clarified in this modelling
exercise and require a more in-depth analysis to under-
stand the dynamics underlying the result.
Conclusion
Bulk-billing rates and the supply of FFS GPs are two
important supply-side elements in the Australian health
care system that are potentially amenable to policy
Performance of the models Figure 1
Performance of the models. Actual and predicted values 
of the dependent variables in the regression models (a) Deci-
sion to consult, (b) Frequency of consultation.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:18 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/18
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manipulation. To the extent that the Strengthening Medi-
care policy has increased bulk-billing rates, and bearing in
mind the qualifications expressed in relation to the data,
the modelling indicates that an increase in bulk-billing
rates will not necessarily increase access across all Divi-
sions. Unlike the American HIE results which showed no
difference in response across geographic areas, in Aus-
tralia, rurality is clearly important in understanding the
relationships between cost, supply and access to medical
care and needs to be considered when modelling the
impact that policy initiatives on access to FFS GP services.
Strengthening Medicare was specifically designed to
increase access for financially disadvantaged patients and
those less than 16 years of age. The modelling suggests
that, in the late 1990s, FFS GPs were responsive to the
needs of socioeconomically disadvantaged patients and
age was not an important predictor in the utilization of
Medicare-funded GP services. If this situation still existed
prior to the introduction of the new policy, then it is likely
that the impact of the initiative on access to FFS GP serv-
ices for these two groups of patients would be somewhat
restrained.
Finally, geographic differences in bulk-billing rates and
the supply of FFS GPs are often taken to be evidence of
inequities in the provision of heath services. According to
Hancock, social equity requires that the 'provision of
health services ... should not discriminate on the grounds
of ... rurality or geographical location' [44]. However, pol-
icy strivings for equivalence in performance indicators
such as bulk-billing rates across geographic areas will not
necessarily result in geographic equity of access. If geo-
graphic accessibility is not addressed, ensuring equity of
access to FFS GP services in Australia would seem to
require positive discrimination in favour of rural areas
such that the supply of FFS GPs and bulk-billing rates are
higher in rural than metropolitan areas.
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